Sunday, March 21, 2004
OIF/TELIC ONE YEAR ON - WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION Well, of course the big unanswered question is that of weapons of mass destruction. The reason why this remains so live is of course because it was a vital key in building the case for war and so far it looks completely nonsensical. For the anti-crowd this does bring the great advantage with it that this is a stick they can beat the pro-gang with repeatedly with great effect, because it looks we hawks were wrong and/or manipulative. Either way it's an important issue because it has far wider implications beyond Iraq. I'm not going to expend much of my own breath on it right now, but instead link to some relevant pieces I'd recommend:
- Robert Kagan and William Kristol explain Why We Went to War in a piece that reassembles the pre-war intelligence
- as a sceptic Jonathan Freedland pours scorn on the Blair Government for hanging onto the wmd claim despite Washington's gradual distancing
- Timothy Garton Ash is annoyed that we were duped
- but Jonah Goldberg thinks the sceptics are very wrong
- down the Washington end Jim Hoagland has some scepticism about the workings of the intelligence services
- to which Sidney Blumenthal replies that there was no failure of intelligence, but in fact the political meddling produced the impression of threat,
- a point taking up on this side of the Big Pond by Sam Kiley
- but this is confusing, because as Charles Paul Freund asks the question, why Saddam pretended to have weapons he didn't actually have
- But the ultimate and quite long piece everybody refers to, is Kenneth M. Pollack's: Spies, Lies, and Weapons: What Went Wrong, in the Atlantic Monthly, along with the interview he gave
(Kenneth Pollack was of course one of the most convincing advocates of regime change and the author of the key text The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq)
- at the end of the day Charles Krauthammer explains that it was vital we called Iraq's Bluff anyway.
- Douglas Hanson, one of the men on the ground shows why the case is not closed because of largely technical reasons most of the potential sites haven’t been searched yet and scientists questioned,
- John Keegan raises an issue of great importance, because in future we are going to be asked to support more actions, if not outrigth wars, on the basis of intelligence, but the problem is that intelligence is always open to interpretation,
- and finally, Anne McElvoy argues Why WMD question must not be allowed to go away, making clear why at the end of the day, the issue must be confronted openly by our leaders.
PS: If you’re fed up with the Iraq debate, blogging will be back to normal again in a few days.
- Robert Kagan and William Kristol explain Why We Went to War in a piece that reassembles the pre-war intelligence
- as a sceptic Jonathan Freedland pours scorn on the Blair Government for hanging onto the wmd claim despite Washington's gradual distancing
- Timothy Garton Ash is annoyed that we were duped
- but Jonah Goldberg thinks the sceptics are very wrong
- down the Washington end Jim Hoagland has some scepticism about the workings of the intelligence services
- to which Sidney Blumenthal replies that there was no failure of intelligence, but in fact the political meddling produced the impression of threat,
- a point taking up on this side of the Big Pond by Sam Kiley
- but this is confusing, because as Charles Paul Freund asks the question, why Saddam pretended to have weapons he didn't actually have
- But the ultimate and quite long piece everybody refers to, is Kenneth M. Pollack's: Spies, Lies, and Weapons: What Went Wrong, in the Atlantic Monthly, along with the interview he gave
(Kenneth Pollack was of course one of the most convincing advocates of regime change and the author of the key text The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq)
- at the end of the day Charles Krauthammer explains that it was vital we called Iraq's Bluff anyway.
- Douglas Hanson, one of the men on the ground shows why the case is not closed because of largely technical reasons most of the potential sites haven’t been searched yet and scientists questioned,
- John Keegan raises an issue of great importance, because in future we are going to be asked to support more actions, if not outrigth wars, on the basis of intelligence, but the problem is that intelligence is always open to interpretation,
- and finally, Anne McElvoy argues Why WMD question must not be allowed to go away, making clear why at the end of the day, the issue must be confronted openly by our leaders.
PS: If you’re fed up with the Iraq debate, blogging will be back to normal again in a few days.
