Timmyhawk

RE: RECENT POSTS
It can be painful to watch people who don't know how to look the height of fashion. It looks like the folks at the Center for Security Policy have not quite learnt this lesson yet, for they inform us that:

So, of course, have a look at this posting, the cool kids’ term is tranzies not "transies". And I note the spectre of the "community" also appears, though one might hope that in this case slightly tongue in cheek.

NEOLOGISMS
Politics moves fast these days, and so do the terms used to discuss it. For the fastness see my last posting: they were released the next day, so how up-to-date was that? Anyways . . . . Here's two newies I draw your attention to:
Labrador Conservatism? Read the post it's got a few good points in it. I do wonder though whether it might be too optimistic about Cameron?
Transnationalism, is I think easier than transnational progressivism or indeed Richard North’s description, which is even more accurate: the dual international quasi-legislation/comitology mechanism. No, I don’t see that one catching on either, so transnationalism it is.

WHAT WE REALLY NEED
ConHom has a story about another Eurosceptic pressure group, this one to be called Global Vision (yawn). Plenty of criticism has been made in that posting, asking whether we don’t already have enough such outfits, which we certainly do a plenty. Problem is they keep missing the bigger picture, namely what our EU membership is really about.
Why are we in the EU? It’s not to stabilise our democracy, it’s not to improve our governance, it’s not for economic gain. Essentially it’s the same reason we have the special relationship to the US for. Our establishment sees itself as world power leader. After 1945 it was apparent that we didn’t have the strength and money to do this entirely on our own feet, hence the special relationship which could lower military technology costs and give us extra diplomatic clout by having a privileged access to the White House. Suez proved though that we couldn’t rely on the US enough. Hence the drive to get into European integration. And that’s really what it’s about, our place in the world.
So what we really need is a serious think-tank that can push debate and advocacy on this point. I pointed out in the past that the Conservatives desperately need this to be more effective as a party too. But above all it matters greatly to the future of our nation. Saying the EU is often inefficient et al is all nice and well, but that simply doesn’t cut it. Perhaps those inefficiencies are a price worth paying for the global position that EU-membership gives us. Perhaps it isn’t. Either way, any alternative strategies need to be embedded in an all-round foreign policy agenda which the right simply doesn’t have. There was an attempt some time ago that failed, the New Frontiers Foundation. That it failed tells us sadly how disoriented the British right is on these matters. Only when we can seriously match liberalish outfits like the Foreign Policy Centre or the Centre for European Reform do we stand a chance of intellectual and electoral renewal.
We owe that to our country and its future.

WHAT’S IN A TITLE?
IF the whole situation weren’t so awful this would be comical:

Thank God there is such a position in the Sudanese government . . . Whether the ICC could prove much of a solution I don’t know (see here, here or here; make your own mind up).

As explained below we cannot reverse nuclear arms already aquired in the countries that have them. So, a realistic policy should firstly work at reducing their numbers, an area in which Britain is leading by example. The next realistic step is to stop further proliferation. The risk of this exists in two broad regions: the Pacific and the broader Mediterranean and greater Middle East.
Let's get the Pacific out of the way, as this is outside Britain's strategic sphere. The consequences of North Korea getting away with its programme and a possible weakening of American leadership could lead to the following chain reaction of nuclear weapons aquirement: South Korea & Japan, Taiwan, Australia and Indonesia.

Looking into our own region, let's have a look at the consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran, coupled with a possible drawdown of US-UK regional military policies: Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Turkey as the first in line would go nuclear first. In turn this would pressure and open opportunities for Egypt, Lybia and Greece. Leading on from there Algeria and Syria can also not be discounted entirely. Once this is getting underway, who can say that other European powers, especially Germany will not be tempted as well? Additionally remember the strategic pressure represented by Russia.
This is bad for Britain's security. So, in order to counter this we will have to work on strategic arrangements and security deals that will lift the potential burden of Iranian/Russian nuclear blackmail from these countries. This would require resetting our alliances and making it clear that armed conflict will at some point draw in British military force, which must, and will, ultimately be insured with nuclear weapons.
Such a policy would not be able to reverse nuclear weapons in any of the countries in our strategic neighbourhood (Britain, France, Israel, US, Russia, Iran), but it would prevent the spread of such weapons to other countries.

(See also this article in the JPost by Emanuel Adler on the Israeli case, which makes a good point, similar to mine, and which ties in with this earlier posting).

TRIDENT RENEWAL: TOWARDS NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
Needless to say, it would be nice to be done entirely with such expensive and dangerous weapons, but Britain alone cannot not achieve anything with unilateral moves, except disadvantage the UK’s strategic position.
However, nuclear disarmament can only work if all potential competitors agree to do likewise, and in a simultaneous and verifiable fashion.

Who would that be for Britain/France/EU? And what other factors might drive their nuclear programmes?
Iran: Strategically this is a fairly direct neighbour. Iran claims in addition to us and the French, the US and Israel as concerns. Rivalry of course also with Russia.
Russia: Whilst there may not be much threat of any kind of serious conflict, we cannot know what the future holds, and in addition growing energy dependence on Russia would mean that our nuclear climbdown would shift the balance of power and influence excessively to Russia. So, what drives Russian nuclear arms policy? Its additional strategic neighbours and competitors are Iran, China and the US.

What follows from this? These countries would now have to be considered in a disarmament deal. So, like above:
Israel: To offset its numerical and spatial disadvantage vis a vis its neighbours, and because of Iran's programme, any Israeli disarmament moves are effectively impossible. And who knows who will follow in the region once Iran goes nuclear and the US-UK coalition abandons the region to its own devices: Iraq, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt are the most likely candidates; but more on this later.
China: Obviously the US is the main concern for China and additionally India plays a role, just as North Korea will be of some concern. Additionally a failure to contain North Korea and the weakening of American leadership would lead to more proliferation: most likely Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and maybe Australia.
US: Strategic concerns about Iran, Russia, China and North Korea.

So again: What follows from this? These countries would now have to be considered in a disarmament deal. So, like above:
North Korea: nukes used to extract international aid, strategic concern about the US and China.
India: Rivalry with Pakistan and China.

If we now add in Pakistan (vis a vis India, perhaps Iran), we have all the world's nuclear powers involved. From this we can conclude that the nuclear disarmament of Western Europe will only be possible within a framework that sees total global nuclear disarmament.
Whilst the likelihood of this is fairly small, formulating this as an end goal for British foreign policy to support is nonetheless right.
But before this can come about, Britain is right to keep its nukes, while making sure that the numbers are as small as possible. And on this, the Government for once seems to have got it right.

TRIDENT RENEWAL: WHY WE NEED IT
I want to keep this post as short as possible. Basically it is the right decision to renew Britain's nuclear weapons because we live in a strategic neighbourhood with other nuclear powers, and many potential ones. The motives of these are not always going to be benign, so we need to be sure the balance of power doesn'zt shift too much to our disadvantage.

The question now of course is, why not just rely on our allies? Personally I see no reason why we should lay our fate entirely in America's hands, who's to say that US interests will always overlap sufficiently for the US to remind our competitors of American nukes. Generally speaking probably yes, but the US is increasingly going to look away from (Western) Europe, for better or for worse.
So, why not rely on France? Despite many more differences than we have with the US, surely mere geography will ensure that French nukes protect us as well? Given some of the goals for British nuclear policy I will outline later, I think this is unlikely. In addition it misses the fact, that with France having the only nuclear weapons in Western Europe, it will get to call the shots on all matters regarding NATO and especially the EU. Polemically put, if we give up our nukes, there goes our opt-out out of the euro and common tax policy. If France gives up its nukes, its goodbye to the Common Agricultual Policy.
I assume that Western Europe will require a West European nuclear weapon for the foreseeable future, so why not switch British and French nukes to an EU system? As a eurosceptic I instinctively repel against this, but in theory this could one day be possible. Pigs might develop wings . . . . though with genetic engineering this might actually become possible one day. . .. Either way, this is not on the cards currently, and theoretically the EU might one day fail significantly enough for Britain to leave or the whole thing to collapse.

So, the prudent thing is to ensure that Western Europe has its "own" nukes, and that at least half of these are British.
I will provide more details on the reasons for such weaponry and how to change our nuclear weapons policy in the future in separate posts coming online later today.

LEGAL ISSUES ON INVADING IRAQ
I will flesh this out properly one day but given some discussions I have been party to recently I though I might as well make my key points again:

There are differing views by legal experts. I have no legal training so I am not qualified to examine all relevant documents in the correct manner.
It is true that the accusation is often raised that those who support the legality of the invasion are or have been in the employ of Government. However, this does not refute any of their arguments, and it is only logical that experts who share the Government’s view would also work for and support the Government.
In an equal manner, those legal scholars who claim the action was illegal are -just like anyone else- not some completely neutral opinion-free minds; they have their own personal political views and agendae too. In part this is due to professional reasons. Lawyers like to change the world by laws, so when laws fail and military force takes over they are understandably disappointed. Psychologically it is of course far more pleasing to blame Governments’ behaviour than accepting that one own profession has only limted abilities.
The other factor to be considered in international law experts is their basic motivation. How many of them became international legal scholars because they see themselves as internationalists trying to make a better world by making rules that instinctively favour the weak? And how many of them turned to this field because they wanted to serve Queen and Country and give international power politics a more sensible framework? Given that many of these experts tend to be involved in left-wing political activism, such as CND, their political biases must also be factored into the evaluation of their judgements.

So far to the experts’ background. There are two points to be made about the actual issue as far as I can see it.
Firstly, before turning to the real meat, there is the unaddressed issue of the Genocide Convention. This convention requires all signatory states, practically the whole globe, to take all measures necesary to put an end to genocide. These measures include war, and thus the convention puts the protection of human beings above state sovereignty. It also demands that all countries seek to bring the perpetrators to justice, and this requirement does not cease once the genocide is over. The Saddam regime’s war against the northern Kurds in 1988 is generally accepted by virtually all experts as being genocidal. Indeed Saddam is currently being tried for this in court. So the situation in 2003 was that Saddam Hussein was a perpetrator of genocide, and it was a legal requirement upon all signatories to the Genocide Convention, including of course the US and the UK, to bring Saddam to justice. The only way this was feasible was by invading Iraq and toppling his regime. So, whilst this is not generally used as an argument because it is only incidental to the question of the invasion in 2003, this could nonetheless be used an argument that shift the balance of doubt towards the coalition.

Secondly, and this is the real argument is the question of legitimacy. This is a more political and moral category than legality but it is an easier way to approach the issue for non-experts. First of all it is important when the Iraq war started, namely in 1990 when Iraq occupied Kuwait. So the war that we are to some extent still stuck in was initiated by Iraqi aggression. This aggression means that responsibility for the war lies with the regime of Saddam Hussein. After the coalition’s first round of operations a ceasefire was put into place. Iraq then spent the next 11 years violating the conditions of the ceasefire. As it is up to the aggressor to step down for peace to ensue, the coalition was entirely in its right to resume military operations against the aggressor.
Some of these circumstances were codified by UN-resolutions, which lead to the argument that an explicit UN-Security Council agreement had to be reached on going back to war. There are differing interpretations as to whether this was necessary, or whether the fact of Iraqi aggression and previous UN-resolutions were sufficient (the US administration’s view). There was an argument that a more up-to-date UN edict was necessary and an explicit choice for offensive military force desireable (the UK Government’s view). This is in turn in doubt as it would make the UN Security Council the highest legal authority in Britain, thus overriding the sovereignty of Parliament; a position hardly tenable for a mere diplomatic forum. However the sceptics’ view says that existing British legal frameworks, by being member of the UN, incorporate the need for giving precedence to the UN. Additionally there is the argument that because the legalitity/legitimacy of the war was, at least in part, in the hands of the UN, it could not be taken out of the UN process.
On a specifically British point one could also point out that in granting independence the UK guaranteed to Kuwait its existence and was thus bound by treaty to regard Iraqi aggression against the emirate as aggression against Britain.
To summarise, it could be said that the legal onus lay on Iraq as the aggressor, but it could also be argued that the switch from defensive to offensive military operations could only be authorised by Security Council mandate, thus rendering the coalition’s action legally dubious. I suppose, being of a somewhat conservative bent, I don’t have much time for transnationalism to begin with and am so inclined to share the Bush Administration’s view. Indeed I would say that this is a case were classical arguments on resisting aggression apply, which are unwritten laws of international order and are universally accepted. Thus there would be no further need for any other treaties or conventions to come into play. But, as I said, that a somewhat right-wing view and is certainly not widely shared (ahem).

BRITAIN GETS SERIOUS?
I do whine quite often about how the British public is so parochial that it doesn’t care about the serious business of foreign affairs, but here is some encouragement from recent polling:

Personally I would rate the economy and law & order higher schools’n’hospitals, but it is good to see some concern about our place in the world. Now if I can only get people agree with me . . . I wonder though whether David Cameron near complete silence on these issues explains part of his weakened popularity?

IS BUSH GETTING IT?
A theme I have turned to sometimes seems to getting through to Bush:

Well, he’s got the wording right, but then he usually does – it’s the implementation that normally leave to be desired . . .

DEALING WITH IRAN: WHY WE NEED AN ISRAELI SECURITY GUARANTEE
Is it time for an "Osiran" strike? Is the solution to the current crisis about Iran's nuclear weapons programme a repeat of Israel's famed attack on Saddam's Osirak facility, or O'Chirac if you prefer that spelling?
I can see that many people are hoping this is going to happen. In a way it's a dream scenario: Israel does the actual dangerous and dirty work, the Coalition can huff and puff and indignantly protest how Israel has destroyed all its efforts at a peaceful solution etc., and in the end the problem is fixed or at least delayed. Equally the strategic fall-out would only hit Israel in the form of Iranian proxy retaliation via Hizballah and possibly Hamas, so we're in the clear on that one as well. Phew.
On the other hand if Britain and her allies take military steps against Iran there is going to be serious violence in Iraq, the conditions for which are already in place. As Iranian agents have reportedly been observing targets in Western cities, we may well even get some heavy hits on the "home front". Well, better let Israel take the brunt until we can find some magic wand to make the nuclear problem disappear.
One thing is clear however, a military strike by Israel alone will not suffice to end the Iranian programme it can only delay it a bit. Still it is an option Israeli policy makers will be considering now. And the timing is becoming more urgent. As has been pointed out by Richard North and the Wall Street Journal, Iran will soon have a new set of high-tech air defences from Russia (SA-15 Gauntlet, to be precise). These new systems would be good enough to make a single strike by Israel ineffective. That means that if Israel wants a sensible, i.e. non-nuclear option against Iranian nukes, it has until about March to do so, when the Russian systems are up and running. After that the options of dealing with Iran via air strikes will only be open to the US Air Force's stealth bombers, F-117s and B-2s.
The consequence of this situation is that Israel must either act now, or completely place its fate in the hands of the US and the EU-3, not to mention Russia and China. If you were an Israeli what would you be thinking?
So an Israeli strike is well on the table, and there is plenty of rumour about this sloshing around too.

But is this really desirable? I don't think so. There is a real risk that Iranian counter measures would spill over on to non-Israeli targets, including British ones. After all an attack by the demonised "Zionist entity" would be the perfect ideological rallying tool for Iran's current leader. He has something of a pedigree here after all. So, who's to say an Israeli strike couldn't be used as an excuse to recruit for and launch a serious jihadist campaign in the region and beyond. This would clearly hurt our interests, though this is a more speculative outcome.
Another problem I see is that diplomacy may still have some hope in Iran. Perhaps not in changing the ambitions of the current leader, but perhaps by slowing the programme down enough for an internal regime change to occur (or at least some moderation). An Israeli strike would clearly be a further step to full on violent escalation and I don't think we are politically or militarily entirely prepared for that yet. If we ever will be.

From this problem there are two separate courses of remedial action to be taken.
Firstly, there must be a way to stop Russia providing Iran with the Gauntlet missile system.
Secondly, and this is the key point of this posting, we have to find a way to dissuade Israel from attacking. Israel has many a good reason to carry out a strike, if it cannot depend on anyone else for its security. So an obvious step to take now would be for the US and the EU-3 to offer a clear security guarantee to Israel. Such a guarantee would bind all countries security together in this instance and by putting Israel's security into the diplomatic mix openly and comprehensively would remove Israel's need for action.

This would be a logical and necessary step, so it will be eventually taken, when it's too late, as these things always are. Nonetheless, it's simple really, it only requires a bit of political foresight. So, fingers crossed.

ARE WE READY FOR WAR WITH IRAN?
It seems like the situation is beginning to hot up for real this time. The EU-3 have made it clear that referral to the UN Security Council is now seriously on the table. Whilst in itself that may not be daunting challenge to the current Iranian regime, it does however signal a change in EU attitudes. Additionally, taking the issue to the UN marks the end of the kind of conciliatory diplomacy that the EU has been trying on its for the past 2-3 years. The next phase now will probably be a joint effort with the US at coercive diplomacy. How long that will last is hard to say. The possible end point of such an approach could well be military action. By whom and under what circumstances remains to be seen. An Isreali strike by March is a real possibility now. That may well be bluffing on Israel's part, but that bluffing is certainly aimed at getting others to act. To be clear, diplomacy may well achieve the goal of stopping Iran from getting nukes. But this will only be possible if there is a united diplomatic front against this, and a united Western military commitment to enforce a denial of nuclear weapons to Ahmadinejad's hands.
So, we have to prepare ourselves mentally and practically for war. Only that way can we build up the necessary pressure for diplomacy to work. Which again proves the old saying: si vis pacem, para bellum!

NOTES: THE EU-JUGGERNAUT, PRESERVING THE CHURCH, LOSING OUR MORALE OVER IRAQ, APPEARANCE OF NEW TORY FOREIGN POLICY?, ARMENIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM
Whilst I complained that many people in this country were going slack in regards to the expansion of EU (and less recently), that was more of an aside, I had little idea just how fast and far the EU was actually going. In the Speccie's cover story Anthony Brown recounts some of the major development from only the past few months. It is pretty dizzying reading. Whilst one could try to find solace in Brown's remark that

I fear the EU is simply doing its usual thing in flying under the radar. Again it's a shame that the main press doesn't really pick these stories up properly. In turn of course that leads to angry-old-man-syndrome when it suddenly becomes apparent that the EU has instigated some mind bogglingly stupid and rightfully unpopular move like forcing out the Red Ensign. Well, probably too late if true. By the time you see the result of EU regulations or an expansion of EU institutional competences it's probably already too late to do anything about it - that's how it works. It's time the wider public got to understand this better. It's good of the Speccie to run these stories (and reminds me why we really need it), but that is just not enough.


Having spent the day in Canterbury I am impressively reminded why I stand by the Church of England, despite some of its growing troubles. When you look at the Cathedral but also some of the smaller Church buildings spread around you are not immediately struck by it. It's when you look closer, that what really conveys the quiet splendour of the Anglican faith are the little details and the air of historical matter-of-courseness that accompanies the Church and its works. It certainly grew on me again while I was there.


In Saturday's Times Matthew Parris has an interesting comment on Iraq, in which he says that whatever we may consciously argue, subconsciously we all agree on Iraq having failed. I am afraid I know what he means. When Iraq hawks talk and particularly blog amongst themselves it all seems less bad, but the moment you open a newspaper, switch on the telly or the radio you can't avoid this sinking feeling. I see no reason (yet?) to change my mind over invading and occupying Iraq, but the emotional commitment to the enterprise had been gone for a long time. In the lead up to the invasion there was a real feeling that things were changing for the better, and this was a just and necessary war that it was a pleasure to be an advocate for. I can't really say when that tipping point came. Looking back there are two points that stand out for me.
The first was Bush's "mission accomplished" show. At the moment when the war was going into its more difficult phase of reestablishing order in Iraq Bush was effectively saying there's nothing to do anymore, let's go home. That built up exactly the wrong kind fo expectation both in the military and the public. After you've created the impression that the job is as good as done and you then say, "yes, but I need to send an extra two hundred thousand troops in for at least a year" (a realistic war plan I would wager), people are going baulk at that. I think this is when I began feeling that our leaders were possibly going to mess things up.
The second was the David Kelly affair. Whether or not Andrew Gilligan was journalistically right or not to blow the wmd story up at a time when public support was already beginning to wane I will leave to others to debate; ultimately there’s nothing that can be done about freedom of the press, even if that freedom gets used badly. But again like Bush’s speech this was in the transformationary phase of the war. To run a proper nation building war effort would have required public backing. The Kelly affair set off the then sheer endless stream of officials past and present rolling out supposed exposes about wmd lies. This helped undermine public morale. Why the Government was so incompetent in meeting this bad pr remains a mystery to me, given how good they are normally at spinning.
But both those incidences I think we’re instrumental in pushing the emotional dimension of the Iraq war debate in the wrong direction. To be sure, there is plenty that went wrong policy and argument wise to be sure.
If you read the Economist's fine leader on Iraq this week you are struck by the level of disappointment that seeps through the comment. That is a feeling I sadly share. What makes it worse is that I know it's possibly too late to make a real shift in strategy. That would also be politically difficulty increasingly in Iraq itself now I guess. Otherwise I think this posting from more than two years ago describes what would needed to be done.
(As an aside, advocating the invasion of Iraq may have been a pleasure, but socially comfortable it wasn't; I guess people don't really like debating politics properly in a social environment; it's more about finding commonality with other, which intensifies ten-fold the displaesure on realising the other side diagrees with you.)


So what template would a Tory Government do to deal with such a situation? Not easy to tell. Back in June I had pointed out that the Conservatives needed to debate and develop clear thinking on foreign policy. Whilst Michael Howard's positions had already hinted in an interventionist, hawkish and sovereignist direction, it seems that outlook is gaining traction amongst the Tories. In this week's Speccie Peter Oborne reports on a London meeting of the Henry Jackson Society. Plenty of up and coming Tories in there. It certainly looks like this is where the Conservatives seem to be heading in terms of forging a new foreign policy consensus. This will definitely help the Conservatives win the next election. After all, one of my favourites themes I like to go on about is how you can’t fight properly in politics if you don’t have certainty on the national strategy, Britain’s place in the world and on how you would decide matters of war and peace. Even if there is a wide political range in the Henry Jackson Society itself, most are centre-right and I think it is no safe to say that therefore the Tory revival edges closer.
(see also Stephen Pollard)


After the doubtful occurances during Azerbaijan’s elections recently, time to turn to another South Caucasus state and an expression of public will, the constitutional amendment referendum in Armenia. The proposal would most importantly have moved powers away from the presidency towards parliament. After first hearing about it I thought this looks a lot more promising avenue for bringing genuine democracy into the post-Soviet sphere than trying to do so in single big steps such as revolutions or general elections. By gradually starting to move things from the bottom up, piece by piece, chances are far better that the democracy that emerges from that will hold. Sadly, it seems the referendum has followed the dubious routes that similar events have gone in the ex-USSR. Shame really. Hopefully it will work one day.

I MUST BE A NEOCON THEN . . . .
. . . if a quiz says so:

Based on your answers, you are most likely a neoconservative

Not so sure about that. Also note that the CSM completely ignores any domestic policy issue, on which there are a number of vital differences between me and neoconservative positions. A common oversight that reduces the value, in light of the domestic agenda’s defining importance.

Being a participant in the Iraq war or not is not really the defining characteristic of being a sovereign country but I'll let that slide as unfortunate rhetoric. So Germany is not sovereign because of US troops on its soil? Nevermind European integration, the Euro, the ICC, . . . It's obvious this is just Yank-bashing, and there is no evidence whatsoever that the US forces in any way have any influence over German policy. Quite obviously not when you come to think of it.
Of course Schroeder's governing SPD doesn't want to be left out of this, so for the SPD parliamentary vice-chairman Michael Mueller the opposition's expert on finance, Paul Kirchoff, is the German representative of the US "neoconservatives". Apparently Kirchoff has a secret agenda to turn Germany into a "different republic" (a very loaded term in Germany), allied as he is with Dick Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz, who of course are responsible for the Iraq war. So there you have it. A finance expert with no public position on Iraq is given the German Left's standard "neocon!"-smear and associated with the Iraq war. (hat tip No Blood for Sauerkraut-Paul)
This obsession with Iraq continues of course with the governing Greens. On a poster which is hanging up all over Berlin, the party asks voters to "Yes! New Energy instead of oil and nuclear". It is illustrated with a picture of a desert, and you can see the shadow of three soldiers on the desert floor.

What has that to do with renewable energies? Well, Iraq of course. Those soldiers are of course Yank-imperialist-stormtroopers out to steal other peoples' oil! Everything is about Iraq! It is all America's fault!
Dear oh dear. They really must be running short on ideas for the future let alone actual achievements in government if this anti-American posturing is all that they can put up. (see John Rosenthal as well.)
Iraq! Iraq! Iraq!, but hang on, they can do empty ad hominem attacks too of course, as Schroeder's wife now demonstrates:

Why not?! So women are only allowed to go into politics if they have had children? That's a pretty bizarre new form of sexism if I may say so. Also quite tall of Schroeder-Kopf to go on as if she had to make any of those difficult decisions she alludes to. It's not too difficult to juggle work and children if you're well off as she is and can afford nannies and all that stuff. So in fact the Chancellor's wife's credibility in this form is equally zero. This kind of smearing is doubly unacceptable because:

It will truly be a joy when the Schroeders get in the removal van. I fear however that the German Left's anti-American hysterics and Iraq obsession will be with us rather longer.

DAN PLESCH ON CURRENT IRAN SITUATION
As I have said, my mind remains to be made up in regards to dealing with Iran. Dan Plesch has a piece in the Groan that makes me rethink the possible military options:

Now, the problem with that, as Plesch then explains, would be that it could tip Iran into chaos and probably lead to The ability to simply attack a few sites in Iran is not really in doubt anyway. Even Israel could probably pull this off:

The question is however, after the delay, then what? I once advocated preparing for UK-US invasion and occupation of Iran to forestall a possibly-nuclear Israeli strike. As Plesch notes (I don't think he himself means it):

Although Plesch himself turns this option down, everything else he writes seems to suggest that is the right course of action to take. He inadvertently makes a persuasive argument that all the problems that dealing with Iran could bring with it - more attacks on our forces in Iraq, destroying oil supply lines, initiating a vast terrorist campaign and the like - will become worse the longer we wait, so the sooner we strike the better. His proposed way out of this scenario however is the clincher that shows how little use his advice really would be:

That sounds great. No really it does. Chances of that happening: nil. And the end of the day one should accept that the world is as it is. It would be hunky dory if all the big countries on the planet sat down at one table and agreed more or less overnight that abolish wmd. Fantastic stuff. And Plesch sure enough has good arguments on his side. But he ultimately makes the big taditional intellectual's error by failing to understand that changes in the real world do not occur by the right arguments and good ideas alone, but by managing conflicting interests. A very basic point one would have though, but one that Plesch slides right over. And ultimately this transforms his points a rather depressing "we're all going straight to hell and there's nothing we can do about it" doommongering.

WOULD IRANIAN NUKES PERHAPS BE OK?
In the current Speccie Bruce Anderson has a great piece on Iran's nuclear weapons programme. His basic premise is, that Iran cannot be halted in its weapons programme, and we ought to consider accommodating it instead of trying to stop this. He argues that even a changed regime would be so weak internally that it would have to rely on the nukes to strenghten its position. Iran is a potential great power and will want to be recognised as such; nukes also serve this purpose. Anderson agrees, as I pointed out the other day, that military options to halt the programme are realistically non-existent. Therefore only a massive sanctions regime would be on the cards. However, as Anderson points out, such a policy would make Iran a poor, suspicious and internally weak country - that still possessed nuclear weapons. Not a good option as we can see with North Korea.
I have a very open mind about what to do about the Iranian nuclear programme, and I find Anderson's essay very persuasive on the whole. But there are a few points that I can't quite stop nagging about. As Anderson writes:

Well I'm sure there are quite a few more Iranians who would accept that Iran's declared intentions towards Israel would justify an imbalance in military power. Strangely enough though, Bruce Anderson is quite happy with Israel's nukes and thinks the Israelis should definitely hold onto them (was in the Times some while ago, though I can't seem to find the link). So, presumeably Anderson thinks that this is an ok-situation. Well I'll just let that thought rest for a moment. But this does point to a wider problem in the region. How do you halt the regional slide into nuclearisation that would inevitably follow Iran's nukes? I can perhaps see a possibility that you could, generally speaking, defend Israel's Middle Eastern monopoly on nuclear weapons as Anderson himself does. But how, could you then go and say, it is also ok for Iran to have nukes, but not for Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and who-knows-who-else? I still think in terms of proliferation security stopping Iran's nuclear weapons programme should be a goal in dealing with Teheran.
The other problem is of course that nukes would make Iran perfectly defended. Undoubtedly, an Iranian government will be nervous about attack when is sees the military forces of the Great Satan in all neighbouring countries bar Armenia (a very short piece of border admittedly, and even Armenia has troops in Iraq). While defence is a legitimate concern and Iran's fears of attack should somehow be met diplomatically, perfect defence also means that Iran has more freedom of manouvre abroad. Given its sponsorship of different terrorist and insurgent organisations, this would be a very negative development for security. Like the Eastern bloc during the Cold War, Iran could provide support for terrorism with impunity.
As I said I have an open mind and the approach that Bruce Anderson has sketched may turn out to be the best, but I'm not quite convinced yet.

OPTIONS FOR A CONSERVATIVE FOREIGN POLICY
This may not be the issue that most Conservatives are thinking of at the moment in terms of making themselves electable again, but it deserves the greatest attention. Charles Moore raised the key points in this respect in yesterday’s Telegraph namely that parties/politicians who don’t seem to have an idea of where to put this country in this world are unelectable, and rightly so too.
I’m not going to go into detail of what I think this should look like, partly because I’m still working on it, but I think in terms of the debate’s dynamics there are xx options on foreign policy for the Conservatives to consider:

Isolationist: This would be a rejection of all international engagement, spurning the relationship with the US, European integration, multi-lateral frameworks, alliance agreements and sceptical about maintaining and defending overseas territories. Sean Gabb is the only bigger name I can think of who fits this bill.
Unilateralist / Isolationist-Plus: Carrying with it a whiff of Empire nostalgia, this sort of approach would retain some elements of the pure isolationist view, but would in constrast be committed to maintaining bilateral support deals with smaller countries such as Belize and to defending overseas territories such as the Falklands. Peter Oborne would fit the bill, for example by opposing European integration, the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, while favouring intervention in Zimbabwe.
America-First: This strand of Tory foreign policy thinking is the one that is currently most widespread in the debate. This approach sees our close relationship to the US as the most important foreign policy goal, and tends to subordinate other issues such as European intregration to maintaining this.
Semi-“neocons”: I definitely used to be one of these, right up from my childhood, but I had a bit of a rethink in late 2000/early 2001 (a story for another day). This is the kind of approach that fuses together the promotion of democracy and human rights with military force and confident Western hegemony. This is strongly interventionist. The signatories of the UK Scoop Jackson fan club would certainly meet the criteria.
Transatlantic bridge: In some respects this would be Blairite world politics in blue. This approach would be a rhetorically hardened and overall more cautious version of Tony Blair’s foreign policy of international engagement.
EUrofederast / Anti-American: I remain to be convinced that this approach, of turning the Tories into dedicated Euroderalists and anti-Americans would work either inside the party or with the potential centre-right electorate the Tories need to win back. The British swing voters may be anti-Bush, but they his intentions to stand as a future Tory leader the most relevant.

(There are a number of options I don’t deal with as they are incompatibly with being a Tory; Pacifism would be an example of that.)

QUOTE OF THE DAY
The Godfather proclaimeth:

Irving Kristol, February 3rd, 1997